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Abstract
We introduce the Android Security Framework (ASF),
a generic, extensible security framework for Android
that enables the development and integration of a
wide spectrum of security models in form of code-
based security modules. The design of ASF reflects
lessons learned from the literature on established se-
curity frameworks (such as Linux Security Modules
or the BSD MAC Framework) and intertwines them
with the particular requirements and challenges from
the design of Android’s software stack. ASF provides
a novel security API that supports authors of An-
droid security extensions in developing their modules.
This overcomes the current unsatisfactory situation
to provide security solutions as separate patches to
the Android software stack or to embed them into An-
droid’s mainline codebase. As a result, ASF provides
different practical benefits such as a higher degree
of acceptance, adaptation, and maintenance of secu-
rity solutions than previously possible on Android.
We present a prototypical implementation of ASF
and demonstrate its effectiveness and efficiency by
modularizing different security models from related
work, such as context-aware access control, inlined
reference monitoring, and type enforcement.
1 Introduction
For several decades now, the need for operating
system security mechanisms to provide strong se-
curity and privacy guarantees has been well under-
stood [28, 45, 31, 5]. Yet, recent attacks against
smartphone end-user’s privacy and security [21, 56,
55, 38, 40, 9, 39] have shown that the fairly new
smart device operating systems fail to provide these
strong guarantees, for instance, with respect to ac-
cess control or information flow control. To rem-
edy this situation, security research has proposed
a wide spectrum of security models and extensions
for mobile operating systems, most of them for the
popular open-source Android OS. These extensions
range from context-related access control [10], to
developer-centric security policies [35] and dynamic,
fine-grained permissions [34, 2, 25, 57], to domain
isolation [7, 6], and type enforcement [47, 8].
However, the lack of a comprehensive security API
for the development and modularization of security
extensions on Android has created the unsatisfactory
situation that all of these novel and warranted se-
curity models are either provided as model-specific
patches to the Android software stack, or they be-
came an integrated component of the Android OS
design [47]. When considering the body of liter-
ature on established security frameworks, such as
Linux Security Modules (LSM) [53] or the BSD MAC
Framework [51], their history has taught that the
need to patch the OS or the hardwiring of a specific
security model impairs both the practical and theo-
retical aspects of security solutions. First, there is in
general no consensus on the “right” security model,
as demonstrated by the broad range of Android se-
curity extensions [10, 35, 2, 57, 7, 6, 47]. Thus, OS
security mechanisms should not limit policy authors
to one specific security model by embedding it into
the OS design. Second, providing security solutions
as “security-model-specific Android forks” impedes
their maintainability across different OS versions, be-
cause every update to the Android software stack
has to be re-evaluated for and applied to each fork
separately.
Contributions. In this paper, we propose the de-
sign and implementation of an Android Security
Framework (ASF) that allows security experts to
develop and deploy their security models in form
of modules (or “security apps”). This provides the
means to easily extend the Android security mecha-
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nisms and avoids that policy authors have to choose
“the right Android security fork” or that the OS
vendor has to impose a specific security model. In
the design of ASF we transfer the lessons learned
and guiding principles from the literature on estab-
lished OS security infrastructures to Android and
intertwine them with new requirements for efficient
security policies for multi-tiered software stacks of
smart devices. This design solves a number of chal-
lenges in establishing a generic and extensible security
framework for Android and we make the following
concrete contributions:
1. Policy-agnostic, multi-tiered security in-
frastructure: The security infrastructure must
avoid committing to one particular security model
and enable authors of security extensions to develop
as well as deploy their solutions in form of code.
This requires special consideration of Android’s multi-
tiered software stack and the dominant programming
languages at each layer of this stack. For ASF we
solve this by integrating security-model-agnostic en-
forcement hooks into the Android kernel, middle-
ware and application layer and exposing these hooks
through a novel security API to module authors.
2. Enabling edit automata policies: Various
Android security solutions realize edit automata poli-
cies that not only truncate but also modify control
flows. In ASF, the application layer and middle-
ware hooks are specifically designed to allow module
authors to leverage the rich semantics of Android’s
application framework and to implement their se-
curity policies as edit automata. This required a
re-thinking of the “classical” object manager design
from the literature by shifting the edit automata logic
from the infrastructure into the security modules.
3. Instantiation of existing security models:
We demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of our
ASF by instantiating different security models from
related work on type enforcement [8, 47], context-
related access control [10], Chinese Wall policies [6],
and inlined access control [2] as modules.
4. Maintenance benefits for security exten-
sions: Our ported security modules show how
ASF simplifies maintainability of security extensions
across different OS versions by shifting the bulk of
effort to the security framework maintainer. This is
similar to the maintenance of the application frame-
work for regular apps. Hence, a comparable benefit
to regular apps [22] in adaption and stability across
OS versions can be expected of security modules.
5. Research and development benefits: We
postulate that developing security solutions against
a well documented security API also greatly con-
tributes to a) a better understanding and analysis of
new security models that form a self-contained unit
instead of being integrated to various components of
the Android software stack, b) a better reproducibil-
ity and dissemination of new solutions since modules
can be easily shared and instantiated, and c) a more
convient application of security knowledge to the An-
droid software stack without the requirement to be
familiar with the deep technical internals of Android.
Outline. The remainder of this paper is structured
as follows. In Section 2 we provide necessary technical
background information on Android’s design and
security philosophy. We survey closest related work
in Section 3 and derive from this design principles for
a generic security framework on Android in Section 4.
We present the design and implementation of ASF
in Section 5 and show the instantiations of different
security models from related work in Section 6. In
Section 7 we evaluate our framework in terms of
performance impact and discuss limitations of our
approach. We conclude in Section 8.
2 Background on Android
In this section we provide necessary technical back-
ground information on Android.
2.1 Primer on Android
Android is an open-source software stack for embed-
ded devices. The lowest level of this stack consists
of a Linux kernel responsible for elementary services
such as memory management, device drivers, and an
Android-specific lightweight inter-process communi-
cation called Binder. On top of the kernel lies the
extensive Android middleware, consisting of native
libraries (e.g., SSL) and the application framework.
System services in the middleware implement the
bulk of Android’s application API (e.g., the location
service) and pre-installed system apps at the appli-
cation layer, like Contacts, complement this API.
Although application layer and middleware apps
and services are commonly written as Java code,
they are compiled to dex bytecode and run inside
the Dalvik Virtual Machine (DVM). In addition to
dex bytecode, apps and services can use native code
libraries (i.e., C/C++) for low-level interactions with
the underlying Linux system. Native code can be
seamlessly integrated into dex bytecode by means of
the Java Native Interface.
Android apps are generally composed of differ-
ent components. The four basic app components
are Activities (GUI for user interaction), Broadcas-
tReceivers (mailbox for broadcast Intent messages),
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Figure 1: Android’s security architecture.
ContentProviders (SQL-like data management), and
Services (long running operations without user in-
teraction). All components can be interconnected
remotely across application boundaries by using dif-
ferent abstractions of Android’s Binder IPC mecha-
nism, such as Intent messages.
2.2 Android’s Security Philosophy
Android’s security philosophy dictates that all apps
are sandboxed by executing them in separate pro-
cesses with distinct user IDs (UID) and assigning
them private data directories on the filesystem.
To achieve privilege separation between apps, An-
droid introduces Permissions, i.e., privileges that an
app is granted by the user at install-time. Without
any permissions an app is not able to access security
and privacy sensitive resources. Permissions are as-
signed to the app’s UID and enforced at two different
points in the system architecture, as depicted in Fig-
ure 1: First, every application sandbox can directly
interact with the underlying kernel through system
calls, for instance, to edit files or open a network
socket. These resources are either of private nature
(i.e., are within the app’s private directory) or pub-
lic resources (e.g., SDCard). Access control in the
filesystem ensures that the apps’ processes have the
necessary rights (i.e., Permissions) to issues particu-
lar syscalls, e.g., to open a file on the SDCard. The
filesystem access control consists of the traditional
Linux Discretionary Access Control, which is com-
plemented (since Android v4.3) by SELinux based
Mandatory Access Control (MAC).
Second, apps can interact through the Android
API in a strictly controlled manner with highly priv-
ileged resources. To ensure system security and sta-
bility, apps are prohibited to access these highly priv-
ileged resources directly. Instead, those resources are
wrapped by system services and apps that implement
the API. For instance, the TelephonyService commu-
nicates on behalf of apps with the radio interface layer
daemon (rild) to initiate calls or send text messages.
Whether an app is sufficiently privileged to success-
fully call the API is determined by a Permission check
within the system services/apps. For this check, the
Binder mechanism provides to the callee (system
service/app) the UID of the caller (app).
3 Related Work
We first provide a synopsis of the development of
extensible kernel security frameworks and discuss
afterwards the current status of security extensions
and frameworks for the Android software stack.
3.1 Extensible Kernel Access Control
The importance of the operating system in providing
system security has been very well studied in the last
decades [45, 28, 5, 31] and different approaches to
extending operating systems with access control and
security policies have been explored. These include
system-call interposition [17, 41], software wrap-
pers [18], and extensible access control frameworks
like Domain and Type Enforcement (DTE) [4], Gen-
eralized Framework for Access Control (GFAC) [1],
and Flask [49]. To realize these solutions, DTE has
been provided as a patch to the UNIX system [3],
while GFAC and Flask have been implemented as
patches to the Linux kernel by the RSBAC [36] and
SELinux [30] projects. However, this led to an intri-
cate situation: On the one hand, maintaining these
solutions as patches incurred high maintenance costs
for adapting the patches to kernel changes. On the
other hand, none of these solutions was included in
the vanilla kernel because this would constrain se-
curity policy authors to one specific security model.
This constrain would be unsatisfying since there ex-
ists in general no consensus on the “right” security
model. To remedy this situation, extensible security
frameworks have been proposed [53, 51] that allow
the extension of the system with trusted code mod-
ules that implement specific security models. Mod-
ule authors are supported with an API that exposes
kernel abstractions as well as operations and facil-
itates the implementation of the desired security
architecture and model. The results of this research
have been integrated into the mainline kernels as
the Linux Security Modules framework (LSM) [53]
and the BSD MAC Framework [51]. Additionally,
different access control models, such as SELinux type
enforcement [48] or TOMOYO path-based access con-
trol [23], have been ported as modules on top of the
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LSM and the BSD MAC framework.
3.2 Android Security
Security research and reported attacks have shown
that the stock Android security mechanisms are in-
sufficient to protect the end-user’s privacy and the
system security. At the same time, research has also
proposed different security extensions for Android to
mitigate these attacks and to improve protection of
the end-user’s privacy. The spectrum of the proposed
solutions covers a wide range of security models and
architectures. To name a few: CRePE [10] provides
a context-related access control, where the context
can be, e.g., the device’s location. Saint [35] enables
developer-centric policies that allow app developers
to ship their apps with rules that regulate the app’s
interactions with other apps and can thus protect the
app from misuse and attacks. Different approaches
to more dynamic and fine-grained permissions have
been proposed based on system-centric enforcement
(Apex [34] and TISSA [57]) or inlined reference mon-
itors (Dr. Android and Mr. Hide [25], Aurasium [54],
and AppGuard [2]). XManDroid [6] enforces Chinese
Wall policies to prevent confused deputy and collu-
sion attacks. TrustDroid [7] and MOSES [44] isolate
different domains such as “Work” and “Private” from
each other. SE Android [47] and FlaskDroid [8] bring
type enforcement to Android, where SE Android
focuses on the kernel layer and has been partially
included into the mainline Android source code, and
FlaskDroid extends type enforcement to Android’s
middleware layer on top of SE Android.
4 Motivation and Requirements
Analysis
The current development of Android security exten-
sions has strong parallels to the initial development
of the above mentioned Linux and BSD security ex-
tensions, since current Android security extensions
are provided as patches to the software stack or, in
the case of SE Android [47], are embedded into the
Android source tree. For the same, above mentioned
reasons as for the early Linux and BSD security ex-
tensions, this impedes the applicability and adaption
of Android security extensions and additionally pre-
cludes many of the benefits that a modular composi-
tion could offer in terms of maintenance: Embedding
SE Android’s security model into Android’s source
tree limits policy authors to the expressiveness and
boundaries of type enforcement, whereas provisioning
security models and architectures as patches to An-
droid’s software stack forces policy authors to chose
a solution-specific Android fork. This requires for ev-
ery version update to the Android OS a re-evaluation
and port of each separate fork. Moreover, security
solutions cannot be easily compared with each other,
because their infrastructures are deeply embedded
into the Android software stack.
In this paper, we develop in the spirit of the two de
facto most established security frameworks, Linux Se-
curity Modules (LSM) [30] and the BSD MAC Frame-
work [51, 52], a generic and extensible Android
Security Framework that allows the instantia-
tion and deployment of different security models as
loadable modules at Android’s application layer, mid-
dleware, and kernel. The two most important guiding
principles from LSM and the BSD MAC framework
that govern the design of our Android Security
Framework are: 1) provisioning of policies as code
instead of data; and 2) providing a policy-agnostic
OS security infrastructure. In the remainder of this
section, we analyze the requirements and challenges
for their transfer to the Android software stack.
Policy as code and not data. The first guid-
ing principle is that policies should be supported as
code instead of data (such as rules written in one
predetermined policy language). Providing an ex-
tensible security framework that supports loading
of policy logic as code avoids committing to one
particular security model or architecture. For An-
droid, this removes the need to chose a particular
extension-specific Android fork or to be limited to
one specific security model in the mainline Android
software stack. Additionally, developing modules
against an OS security API provides the benefits of
modularization for developing and maintaining se-
curity extensions. This includes, foremost, a higher
functional cohesion of security modules and lower
coupling with the Android software stack and, hence,
can significantly reduce the maintenance overhead of
modules, especially in case of OS changes. Moreover,
it allows a better dissemination, comparison, and
analysis of self-contained security modules.
Transferring this principle to an extensible secu-
rity framework for Android poses the additional re-
quirement to consider the semantics and dominant
programming languages of the different layers of An-
droid’s software stack. LSM and the BSD MAC
Framework, for instance, as part of the Linux and
BSD kernels, support modules written in C and oper-
ate on kernel data structures (e.g., filesystem inodes).
While this applies to the Android Linux kernel as well,
an Android security framework should additionally
support modules written for Android’s semantically-
rich middleware and application layers. That means
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modules written in Java and operating on application
framework classes (e.g., Intents or app components).
Policy-agnostic security infrastructure. The
second principle is that the security framework and its
API should be policy-agnostic. This means that the
different layers of the software stack are aware of the
security infrastructure, but policy-specific intrusions
into these layers are avoided and policy-specific data
structures and logic are confined to security modules.
A particular additional requirement for a secu-
rity framework on Android are enforcement hooks in
the middleware and application layer that support
edit automata [27] policies, as promoted by differ-
ent solutions [57, 24, 7, 25, 2]. Edit automata, in
contrast to truncation automata, can not only abort
control flows but also divert or manipulate them and,
thus, give policy authors a higher degree of freedom
in implementing thir enforcement strategies. For in-
stance, when querying a ContentProvider component,
the policy could simply deny access by throwing a
Java SecurityException (truncation), but also modify
the return value to return filtered, empty, or fake
data (edit). To technically enable security modules
to implement edit automata, our design requires a
re-thinking of the “classical” object manager vs. pol-
icy server design that is used, e.g., in LSM. Object
managers (i.e., enforcement points) are responsible
for assigning security labels to the objects that they
manage and for both requesting and enforcing ac-
cess control decisions from the policy server (i.e.,
policy decision point). Because this design embeds
the enforcement logic into the system independently
from the security model, it is unfit for realizing edit
automata. Thus, our design requires hooks that
generically support different enforcement strategies
and shift the enforcement and object labelling logic
from the object managers to the security modules.
Moreover, the security framework should provide
a policy-agnostic infrastructure for common opera-
tions such as event notifications or module life-cycle
management—thus reducing the overhead for policy
authors to implement common functionality.
5 Android Security Framework
In the following we present ASF. We provide further
technical details in the appendices of this submission.
5.1 Framework Overview
The basic idea behind our Android Security
Framework is to extend Android with a new se-
curity API that incorporates the design principles
explained in Section 4. This API allows to easily au-
thor, integrate, and enforce generic security policies.
Figure 2 provides an overview of our ASF and we
explain its building blocks in the following.
5.1.1 Reference Monitors
In our design we differentiate between policy en-
forcing code and policy decision making code. For
enforcement we use reference monitors [26, 11] at all
layers of the Android software stack, i.e., at the ap-
plication layer, the middleware layer, and the kernel
layer. Each reference monitor protects one specific
privileged resource and is placed such, that it is al-
ways invoked by the control flow between the Android
API and access to the resource. The benefit of this
multi-tiered enforcement is that each reference moni-
tor can operate with the semantics of its respective
layer. In conjunction all monitors enable exceedingly
powerful and semantically rich security policies.
5.1.2 Security Modules
Security extensions are deployed in the form of code
modules and loaded into the security frameworks
at the middleware and kernel level. Each module
implements a policy engine that manages its own
security policies and acts as policy decision making
point. Security modules are integrated into the secu-
rity frameworks through a security API that exposes
objects and operations of the different software stack
layers. As part of this API, each module implements
an interface for enforcement functions (i.e., functions
that make a policy decision for a particular reference
monitor in the system), management functions (e.g.,
module life-cycle events), and other interfaces that
will be explained in Section 5.2.
To provide a clear separation between policy de-
cision logic using kernel level semantics and logic
using middleware/application layer semantics, each
module consists of two sub-modules: a Kernel Sub-
Module leveraging the already existing Linux Secu-
rity Module (LSM) infrastructure of the Linux kernel
and a Middleware Sub-Module, for which we
designed and implemented a novel security infras-
tructure at the application and middleware layers.
5.1.3 Front-end Apps
To enable user configurable policies or graphical event
notifications, modules might want to include user
interfaces. To this end, the module developers (or
external parties being aware of the modules) can
deploy standard Android apps that act as front-end
apps and communicate through the framework API
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Figure 2: Android Security Framework architecture.
directly with the module. In our framework API, we
enable this communication through a Bundle based
communication protocol. A Bundle is a key-value
store that supports heterogenous value types (e.g.,
Integer and String) and that can be transmitted via
Binder IPC between the app process and the module.
It is the responsibility of the module to verify that the
caller has the necessary privileges to issue commands.
5.2 Framework Infrastructure
We present now in a bottom-up approach details
about the ASF infrastructure that has been proto-
typcially implemented for Android v4.3 and currently
comprises 4606 lines of code.
5.2.1 Kernel Space
At the kernel level we employ the existing Linux Se-
curity Module (LSM) [53] framework of the Linux
kernel. LSM implements an infrastructure for manda-
tory access control at kernel level and provides a num-
ber of enforcement hooks within kernel components
such as the process management, the network stack,
or the virtual filesystem. The Kernel Sub-Module
is implemented as a standard Linux Security Module
that registers through the LSM API for the LSM
hooks in the system. This enables the implemen-
tation of a variety of different security models that
operate with kernel level semantics. Modules include,
for instance, SELinux type enforcement [48], which
uses security labels attached to filesystem inodes
and process data structures, or TOMOYO [23] for
path-based access control, or custom modules [33].
Kernel-level policies form truncation automata that
terminate illegal control flows, e.g., on access to files.
Since there might be operational inter-
dependencies between the Kernel Sub-Module
and user-space processes (e.g., re-labelling the
security context of files or propagating kernel
access control decisions to the Middleware
Sub-Module), the kernel module can implement
proprietary channels for communication between
kernel- and user-space (e.g., sockets or sysfs entries).
5.2.2 Middleware Layer
At the middleware layer we extended the system ser-
vices and apps that implement the Android API with
hooks that enforce access control decisions made by
the Middleware Sub-Module. The middleware
security framework is executed as a new Android sys-
tem service and mediates between our hooks and the
Middleware Sub-Module. In contrast to previ-
ous solutions for (generic) access control on Android,
our hooks are policy-agnostic and not tailored to
one specific security model. Each hook takes as argu-
ments all relevant, ambient information of the current
control flow that led to the hook’s invocation. For
instance, Listing 1 presents two exemplary hooks in
our system: one for the Intent broadcasting subsys-
tem of the ActivityManagerService (line 1) and one
for the LocationManagerService that implements the
location API of Android (line 2). Both provide to
the Middleware Sub-Module information about
the current caller to the Android API, i.e., App in
Figure 2 (parameters callingUid and callingPid).
However, all other parameters are specific to the
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Listing 1: Exemplary enforcement functions
1 public boolean
security_broadcast_deliverToRegisteredReceiver
(Intent intent, ComponentName targetComp,
String requiredPermission, int targetUid, int
targetPid, String callerPackage, ApplicationInfo
callerApp, int callingUid, int callingPid);
2 public Location security_location_getLastLocation
(Location currentLocation, LocationRequest
request, int callingUid, int calingPid);
hooks’ contexts, e.g., the hook in line 1 provides
information about the Intent being broadcasted (pa-
rameter intent) and the app component that should
receive this Intent (parameters targetComp through
targetPid). Thus, the hooks support policies that
use the rich middleware-specific semantics.
In general, all hooks support truncation automata
as policies by either allowing the module to throw
exceptions that terminate the control flow and that
are returned to the caller of the Android API, or
by explicitly requiring a boolean return value that
indicates whether the hook truncates the control flow
or not (line 1 in Listing 1). A subset of the hooks
additionally supports edit automata policies, that is
the module can modify or replace return values of the
Android API function or modify/replace arguments
that divert or affect the further control flow after
the hook. For instance, the LocationManagerService
hook in Listing 1 (line 2) allows the module to edit
or replace the Location object that is returned to the
app that requested the current device location.
We describe the API of the middleware framework
as well as the detailed structure of modules in the
next sections. Appendix B provides an overview of
the coverage of our current enforcement hooks.
5.2.3 Application Layer
At the application layer, our Android Security
Framework provides a mechanism to inject access
control hooks into apps themselves. This access con-
trol technique is based on the concept of inlined
reference monitors (IRM) pioneered by Erlingsson
and Schneider [16]. The basic idea is to rewrite
an untrusted app such that the reference monitor
is directly embedded into the app itself, yielding a
“self-monitoring” app. The main advantage of policy
enforcement in the caller’s process context is that the
hook and transitively the security module has full
access to the internal state of the app and can thus
provide rich contextual information about the caller.
For instance, by inspecting the call stack, the IRM is
able to distinguish between calls from different app
components, e.g., advertisement libraries, thereby
allowing more expressive and fine-grained access con-
trol policies. ASF provides an instrumentation API
that enables security modules to dynamically hook
any Java function within an app’s DVM. Hooked
functions divert the control flow of the program to
the reference monitor, which thereby not only gains
access to all function arguments but can also modify
or replace the function’s return value. Thus, the IRM
is also able to enforce edit automata security policies.
Furthermore, in contrast to the hooks placed in the
Android middleware, application layer hooks are dy-
namic: Hooks are injected by directly modifying the
target app’s DVM memory when a new app process
is started. This design enables security modules to
dynamically create and remove hooks at runtime as
well as to inject app-specific hooks.
5.3 Middleware Framework API
We elaborate now in more detail on our framework
API and the interaction between modules and the
security infrastructure. Since we use the LSM frame-
work as is, we focus here on our newly introduced
middleware security framework and refer to the ker-
nel documentation [29] for details on the LSM API.
The middleware framework API of our current
implementation contains 168 functions. A full listing
of our current API is provided in Appendix A. This
API can be broken down into the following categories:
Enforcement functions. These module functions
form the bulk of the API (136 methods) and are called
by the framework whenever the enforcement hooks
in system apps and services are triggered. Each hook
has a corresponding function in the module API that
implements the policy decision logic for this hook.
Enforcement functions have the same method signa-
tures as their hooks (cf. Listing 1), i.e., all parameters
provided by a hook are passed to its enforcement func-
tion. Passing arguments by reference or expecting
objects as return values allows these functions to
implement edit automata logic.
Kernel Sub-Module Interface. To avoid policy-
specific interfaces for the communication between
middleware/application layer apps and the Kernel
Sub-Module, we introduce a generic kernel mod-
ule API as part of the middleware framework API.
It allows apps and services a controlled access to
Linux security modules (cf. Listing 3 in Appendix A).
Each security module can implement this interface
and internally translate the API calls to calls on the
proprietary channel between the user-space and the
Linux security module. Two particular challenges
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for establishing this interface were the self-contained
security checks of the kernel module and the require-
ment that this interface is already available during
system boot. To guarantee security, the kernel mod-
ule is required to perform policy checks to verify that
a user-space process is sufficiently privileged to issue
commands to it. Additionally, the kernel module is
called before the middleware framework can load any
Middleware Sub-Module, e.g., it can be called by
Zygote when spawning new app processes. To solve
these challenges, our design avoids an additional layer
of indirection (i.e., IPC) for communication with the
kernel module and loads the interface implementa-
tions via the Java reflection API statically into the
application framework when it is bootstrapped. This
ensures that the calling processes communicate di-
rectly with the kernel module through our generic
API and that the kernel module can be called inde-
pendently of middleware services.
Life-cycle management. Every module must im-
plement functions for life-cycle management, such as
initialization or shutdown. This enables the frame-
work to inform the module when the system has
reached a state during the boot cycle from which on
the module will be called or when the system shuts
down. Modules should use these functions, e.g., to
initiate their policy engines or to save internal states
to persistent storage before the device turns off.
Event notifications. Event notification interfaces
are used to propagate important system events to
the module. For instance, modules should be im-
mediately informed when an app was successfully
installed, replaced, or removed. Although this infor-
mation is usually propagated via a broadcast Intents,
the time gap between package change and broadcast
delivery might cause inconsistencies in module states.
Hence these events must be delivered synchronously.
Framework Callbacks. The framework provides
modules a callback interface for communicating in
a more direct manner with system services, such as
the PackageManagerService, and avoids the need to
go through the Android API. This is desirable for
policy authors that want to leverage the middleware
internal information for a more efficient access con-
trol enforcement. Our current callback interface, for
instance, includes functions that allow modules to
efficiently resolve PIDs to application package names.
Proprietary protocols. We introduced in our
framework API a callModule() function that allows
modules to implement proprietary communication
protocols with other apps that are aware of this
specific module, e.g., the front-end apps (cf. Sec-
tion 5.1). When using callModule(), these protocols
are based on Bundles and enable a protocol similar
to the Parcel-based Binder IPC: apps serialize func-
tion arguments to a Bundle and add an identifier
for the function the receiver should execute with the
deserialized arguments.
IRM Instrumentation. The framework provides
an instrumentation API that enables security mod-
ules to hook any Java function within selected app
processes. Function calls can be redirected to an
inlined reference monitor that enforces policy deci-
sions made by the module. Appendix F explains an
example that uses the instrumentation API.
Hooks injected via the instrumentation API are
local to the app process that the API is called from.
Therefore, all calls to the instrumentation API need
to be performed from within a target application’s
process. We solve this by placing an instrumentation
hook in the ActivityManagerService that is triggered
when a new app process is about to be launched. A
module that implements this hook has to return the
name of a module’s Java class (the inlined reference
monitor) that will be executed within the app’s pro-
cess before control flow is passed to the app itself.
This is accomplished by modifying the arguments
passed to Zygote: Instrumented apps are started via
a special wrapper class that loads and executes the
instrumentation code before running the app.
5.4 Middleware Security Modules
We elaborate in more detail on the structure of secu-
rity modules. Again, we use Linux security modules
as is [29] and, thus, focus here on the Middleware
Sub-Module. A middleware security module is, sim-
ply speaking, an app that is created with an Android
SDK that includes our new security API. It is de-
ployed to a protected location on the file system, from
where it is loaded during boot. The module package
is a Jar file that contains all the module’s program
code, resources, and manifest file (cf. Figure 3):
Module Manifest. The manifest (formatted in
XML) declares properties such as the module author
or code version, and, more importantly, the name of
the main Java class that forms the entry point for
the module.
Classes.dex. The classes.dex file contains, as in
regular Android apps, the Java code compiled to
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manifest.xml classes.dex
LSM.java / liblsm.so Resources
Figure 3: Middleware security module structure.
Dalvik executable bytecode (DEX). It contains all
Java classes that implement the security module’s
logic. During the load process of the Middleware
Sub-Module, the middleware framework uses the
Java reflection API to load the module’s main class
(as specified in the manifest) from classes.dex. To
ensure that the reflection works error-free, the main
class must implement the API as described in Sec-
tion 5.3 (and listed in Appendix A). Since the API
defines currently more than a hundred methods, but
a security module very likely requires only a sub-
set of those, our SDK provides an abstract class
that implements the API. That abstract class can
be sub-classed by the module’s main class, which
then only needs to override the required functions.
The abstract class returns for each non-overridden
enforcement function an allow decision.
LSM interface. The proprietary interface be-
tween the user-space processes and the Linux security
module in the kernel is implemented through a na-
tive library liblsm.so and a corresponding Java class
LSM.java, which exposes the native library via the
Java Native Interface. LSM.java has to implement
the generic interface for the communication with the
kernel that was explained in the previous section.
The generic kernel module interface of ASF (called
KMAC.java) loads LSM.java through the Java reflec-
tion API into Android’s application framework. This
allows apps and services to communicate via KMAC
(and reflectively through LSM.java) with the kernel
module and avoids a policy-specific interface. We ex-
emplify this mechanism in Appendix E by integrating
SELinux into Zygote.
Resources. Each module can ship with propri-
etary resources, such as initial configuration files or
required binaries (e.g., ccstools for TOMOYO [23]).
During module instantiation, the framework informs
the module about the filesystem location of its Jar
file, enabling the module to extract these resources
on-demand from its file.
5.5 Support for Stackable and Dy-
namical Loadable Modules
Finally, two desirable properties for implementing an
extensible security framework such as our ASF are
dynamically loadable policies and policy composition
(i.e., stacking modules). In the following we explain
why we chose to permit these features by design, but
not consider them a requirement for our solution.
Dynamically Loadable Modules. Being able to
dynamically load and unload modules is desirable,
for instance, to speed up the development and testing
cycles of modules and, in fact, we used this feature
during the development of our example use-cases
(cf. Section 6). However, the arguments to support
dynamically loadable modules beyond development
are disputed: First, dynamic loading is not always
technically possible. A small set of static policy mod-
els, such as type enforcement [47, 8], require that
all subjects and objects are labeled with a security
context. Supporting such extensive labeling oper-
ations at runtime is an intricate problem. Second,
there exist security considerations. The loading and
unloading of modules must be strictly controlled to
ensure that only integrity protected, trusted modules
are loaded. Otherwise, given the privileges of mod-
ules, this would open the way to powerful malware
modules. In our design we agree with the conclusions
of the various Linux security module authors [12]
and consider the drawbacks of dynamically loadable
modules to outweigh their benefits. Therefore, we
load the module once during the system boot and per-
mit users of our framework to additionally activate
dynamic unloading and loading of modules. But we
currently do not consider this feature a requirement
for our solution. However, community and market
forces (e.g., vendors of security solutions) have to
determine whether there is a need for supporting
dynamically loadable modules in the future (e.g.,
establishing a “security app market”) and, hence,
whether we have to revise our requirements analysis.
Stackable Modules. Composing the overall pol-
icy from multiple, simultaneously loaded and indepen-
dent policies is a desirable feature, since usually no
“one-size-fits-all” policy exists. Android, for instance,
implements currently a quadruple-policy approach
consisting of Permissions, SE Android type enforce-
ment, AppOps, and Linux capabilities—each being
responsible for a different aspect of the overall access
control strategy. Multiple policies will naturally con-
flict and thus require the security framework to sup-
port different policy composition and reconciliation
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strategies (e.g., consensus or priority based) [43, 32].
However, supporting fully generic policy composition
is quite a challenge and has been shown to be in-
tractable [20]. Thus, despite its benefits, we decided
in our design to follow the lessons learned by the
LSM developers [53] and to only permit module de-
velopers to implement stackable modules, but we do
not provide explicit interfaces for stacked modules
in our framework infrastructure. The approach to
stacking modules would be to provide a “composition
module” that implements policy reconciliation and
composition logic and which in turn can load other
modules and multiplex API calls between them.
6 Example Security Modules
In this section, we demonstrate the efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of our Android Security Framework
by instantiating different security models from related
work. To illustrate the versatility of ASF, we chose
models from the areas of inlined reference monitoring,
context-based access control, domain isolation, and
type enforcement. We present further instantiations
of other security models in Appendix H.
6.1 Inlined Reference Monitoring [2]
We use AppGuard [2] as the use-case to illustrate
the applicability of our IRM instrumentation API,
but similar application rewriting approaches [25] are
also feasible. AppGuard is a privacy app for Android
that enables end-users to enforce fine-grained access
control policies on 3rd party apps by restricting their
ability to access critical system resources. It does
so by injecting an IRM into the apps themselves.
This approach supports security policies not easily
enforceable by traditional external reference monitors
in the Android middleware or kernel, e.g., to enforce
the use of https over http.
Implementation as a module: We ported App-
Guard1 as a module for ASF by separating its pri-
vacy app into three components: We adapted the
(1) AppGuard reference monitor with its dynamic
hook placement and policy enforcement logic to use
the IRM instrumentation API provided by ASF. The
reference monitor is injected into selected app pro-
cesses via our framework at app startup. The policy
decision logic and persistent storage of policy set-
tings was moved into (2) a middleware module. The
middlware module selects the apps into which the
IRM is injected. It also implements a Bundle-based
1Source code provided by the original authors
communication protocol to exchange policy decisions
and security events with the IRM component and
with (3) a front-end app. The front-end app allows
the user to adjust policy settings and to view logs
of security-relevant events. We used the policies in-
cluded in the original AppGuard implementation to
confirm that policy enforcement by our security mod-
ule and by the original implementation are identical.
Our AppGuard security module consists of 5059
LoC in total (cf. Table 1), with 782 LoC residing in
the middleware module and 4277 LoC in the IRM.
Our module diverts in 18.18% of all LoC from the
original code. The majority of the difference, 728
LoC, is attributed to moving the policy decision logic
into the middleware module, while only 46 LoC were
required to adapt the inlined reference monitor to
use the provided instrumentation API.
6.2 CRePE [10]
CRePE is a security extension to Android v2.3 that
enforces fine-grained and context-related access con-
trol policies. The context is based on the geolocation
of the device and, depending on this location, CRePE
either allows or denies apps access to security and
privacy sensitive information. The security policies
can be deployed over different channels, e.g., via SMS.
To enforce the policies, CRePE hooked all relevant
system services, e.g., to override Android’s default
permission check with its context-related check.
Implementation as a module: We ported
CRePE2 as a security module for ASF by moving
its policy engine class CRePEPolicyManagerService
and related classes, which were originally running
as a separate system service, into a module (cf. Fig-
ure 4). On initialization, CRePE’s context detector
registers as a listener for location updates to detect
context changes. Additionally, we used the enforce-
ment functions of our API to re-implement the logic
of CRePE’s hooks. Furthermore, CRePE uses front-
end apps to parse and inject policies from different
channels. We moved the policy parser into the mod-
ule and established a Bundle-based communication
protocol between the front-end apps and the module
to forward received policies for processing. We used
the example policies shipped with the CRePE source
code to successfully confirm that the enforcement by
our module yields the same results as the original
CRePE implementation.
Our port of CRePE as a security module consists
of 3682 lines of code (cf. Table 1), excluding the un-
2Source code retrieved from http://sourceforge.net/
projects/crepedroid
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Existing solution LoC of module policy engine LoC added/removed/edited (total delta)
AppGuard [2] 5059 +828/-79/○ 13 (18.18%)
CRePE [10] 3682 +915/-48/○ 45 (27.38%)
XManDroid [6] 3244 +153/-14/○ 28 (6.01%)
FlaskDroid [8] 4968 +749/-32/○ 40 (16.53%)
Table 1: Effort of porting different security extensions as module on our Android Security Framework.
modified ANTLR runtime (7526 LoC). Of these 3682
LoC 27.38% were changed during the port. The bulk
of this difference, 817 LoC, is attributed to relocating
the policy parser. Implementing the Bundle-based
communication protocol added 74 LoC. Only 2 LoC
had to be changed to adapt CRePE’s calls to the
Android API from its original Android v2.3 imple-
mentation to our Android v4.3 implementation.
6.3 XManDroid [6]
XManDroid extends the security architecture of An-
droid v2.2.1 to enforce Chinese Wall policies between
apps that might jointly leak privacy sensitive infor-
mation. It uses hooks within different system services
in the middleware and TOMOYO Linux at the kernel
level to monitor all access control requests, reflect
these interactions between processes/apps in a graph
model, and use this model to check against policies
whether an inter-app communication would lead to
an attack state. If so, it denies the new communica-
tion. The policy decision logic is implemented as an
extension (APRM ) to the ActivityManagerService.
Implementation as a module: We ported
XManDroid3 to a module for ASF (cf. Figure 5) by
extracting the policy decision logic from the Activity-
ManagerService and moving it into a module. Using
the enforcement functions of our API we moved the
XManDroid hook logic to this module as well and, by
3Source code provided by the original authors
using a proprietary channel, we enabled the APRM
to communicate from the module with the TOMOYO
kernel module. The kernel was specifically compiled
and deployed with a TOMOYO Linux security mod-
ule. The XManDroid source code comes with an
example configuration for the policy described in [6]
and we used this configuration to successfully confirm
that our module yields the same enforcement results
as the original XManDroid implementation.
Our XManDroid middleware module consists of
3244 lines of code, excluding the unchanged JGrapht
library (9256 LoC). Our module differs in only 6.01%
(195 LoC) from the original implementation. Of these
195 LoC, 141 are attributed to additions necessary
for porting XManDroid’s filtering logic for broadcasts
from the ActivityManagerService to the module.
6.4 Type Enforcement [47, 8]
SE Android [47] brought SELinux type enforce-
ment to the Android kernel and established the
required user space support, e.g., it extended Zy-
gote to label new app processes with a security type.
FlaskDroid [8], developed for Android v4.0.3, extends
SE Android’s type enforcement to Android’s middle-
ware. Building on SEAndroid’s kernel and low-level
patches, it adds policy-specific hooks as policy en-
forcement points to various system services and apps
in Android’s middleware. The policy decisions at
kernel level are made by the SELinux kernel module,
while the decisions at middleware are made centrally
in a policy server service. Both policy decision points
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Frequency Mean (µs)
Stock Android 4.3 7320 116.182±4.550
ASF v4.3 6009 129.851±5.681
Table 2: Weighted average performance overhead of
executing hooked functions in stock Android and in
our Android Security Framework. The margin
of error is given for the 95% confidence interval.
decide based on subject type, object type, and object
class reported by the hooks at their respective layer
whether control flows should be truncated or not.
Implementation as module: We realized type
enforcement with our ASF by porting FlaskDroid4
as a module (cf. Figure 6). At kernel level, we use the
SE Android kernel and provide an SELinux-specific
interface implementation for the kernel module. A
technical description of this interface implementation
is provided in Appendix E. Further, we moved the
middleware policy server and its dependencies into
the middleware module. Using the enforcement func-
tions of our API, we moved the policy-specific hook
logic of FlaskDroid into the module as well (cf. Ap-
pendix G). Additionally, we used SE Android’s build
system to label the file-system with security types.
Our port of FlaskDroid’s middleware component
as a security module consists of 4968 lines of code
(cf. Table 1) and differs in only 16.53% of all LoC
from the original code. The bulk of these changes
(550 LoC) is attributed to additions for implement-
ing a mapping from the enforcement functions of our
framework API to FlaskDroid’s type checks. To con-
firm the correct enforcement of policies, we used the
policies for middleware and kernel level that are pro-
vided with the FlaskDroid source code. Additionally,
we noticed during our tests that the original imple-
mentation contains an error in assigning middlware
security types to processes.5 Additional changes were
necessary to fix this error in our FlaskDroid module.
7 Evaluation and Discussion
In this section we evaluate the performance of our
Android Security Framework and discuss its
current scope and prospective future work.
4Source code retrieved from http://www.flaskdroid.org/
5It maps process UIDs always to the security type of the
first package in a shared sandbox, although the policy can
define different types for packages that share a UID.
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7.1 Performance
Although the actual performance overhead strongly
depends on the overhead imposed by the loaded mod-
ule, we wanted to establish a baseline for the impact
of our Android Security Framework on the sys-
tem performance. The performance of LSM has been
evaluated separately, e.g., for SEAndroid [47], and
we are interested here in the effect of our new mid-
dleware security framework on the performance of
instrumented middleware system services and apps.
Methodology. We implemented our ASF as a
modification to the Android OS code base in ver-
sion 4.3_r3.1 (“Jelly Bean”) and used the Android
Linux kernel in branch android-omap-tuna-3.0-jb-
mr1.1. We performed micro-benchmarks for all exe-
cution paths on which a hook diverts the control flow
to our middleware framework: We first measured the
execution time of each hooked function with no secu-
rity module loaded and allowing by default all access.
Afterwards we repeated this test with hooks disabled
to measure the default performance of the same func-
tions and thus operating like a stock Android. All
our micro-benchmarks were performed on a standard
Nexus 7 development tablet (Quad-core 1.51 GHz
CPU and 2GB DDR3L RAM), which we booted
and then used according to a testplan for different
daily tasks such as browsing the Internet, sending
text messages and e-mails, contacts management, or
(un-)installing 3rd party apps.
Micro-benchmark results. Table 2 presents the
number of measurements for each test case and their
mean values. To exclude extreme outliers, we ex-
cluded in both measurement series the highest decile
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of the measurements. For ASF the mean is the
weighted mean value with consideration of the fre-
quency of each single hook. Table 4 in Appendix C
provides a break down of the most frequently called
hooked Android API functions and their mean execu-
tion time. In overall, our framework with no loaded
module imposed with 129.851 µs approximately only
11.8% overhead compared to stock Android. Figure 7
presents the relative cumulative frequency distribu-
tion of our measurements series and further illustrates
this low performance overhead. Appendix D provides
an overview of the micro-benchmark results for our
example modules from Section 6.
7.2 Current Scope and Future Work
System setup. Certain security models require a
preparatory system setup. For instance, type enforce-
ment requires a pre-labelling of all subjects and ob-
jects as well as enabling the SELinux kernel module.
After the system has been setup, ASF supports mod-
ularization of these security models (cf. Section 6.4).
Module Integrity. As part of the kernel, theKer-
nel Sub-Module has the highest level of integrity.
In contrast, the Middleware Sub-Module, as a
user space process, can be circumvented or compro-
mised by attacks against the underlying system (e.g.,
root exploits) and thus requires support by the ker-
nel modules to prevent low-level privilege escalation
attacks. Inlined reference monitors are inherently sus-
ceptible to attacks by malicious applications, because
the reference monitor executes in the same process
as the application that it monitors and no strong se-
curity boundary exists between the monitor and the
app code. To remedy this situation, we are currently
retrofitting Android’s application model to combine
the benefits of inlined and of system-centric reference
monitors. By splitting apps into smaller units of trust
(e.g., app components and ad libs), system-centric
reference monitors are able to differentiate distinct
trust levels within apps [42, 50, 46, 37].
Completeness. It is crucial for the effectiveness
of our security framework, that all access to security
and privacy sensitive resources is mediated by the
reference monitors. We consider it out of scope for
this submission to formally verify the completeness
of our prototype framework, but plan to use recent
advances in static and dynamic analysis on Android
to verify the placement of our hooks, similarly to
how it was done for the LSM framework [13, 19].
Information flow control. Our framework pro-
vides modules with the control over which subject
(e.g., app) has access to which objects (e.g., device lo-
cation), but it cannot control how privileged subjects
distribute this information. Controlling information
flows is an orthogonal problem specifically addressed
by solutions such as TaintDroid [14],AppFence [24],
or MOSES [44]. We plan to integrate such data flow
solutions into our framework and to extend our se-
curity API with new generic calls for taint labeling
and taint checking.
Framework Maintenance. ASF removes the
burden for authors of security extensions to patch
every Android OS version. Instead it puts this bur-
den onto the framework maintainer, which is prefer-
ably the OS vendor like Google. In light of the
vendor’s expert knowledge about the Android soft-
ware stack, we consider the maintenance overhead
for integrating ASF into the continuous integration
of the Android development as moderate. In partic-
ular the recent development history of Android v4.x,
which had one focus clearly set on security (e.g., in-
tegration of SELinux, use of capabilities, AppOps
and IntentFirewall), makes us optimistic that the
required commitment by the vendor is viable.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we presented the Android Secu-
rity Framework (ASF), an extensible and policy-
agnostic security infrastructure for Android. ASF
allows security experts to develop Android security
extensions against a novel Android security API and
to deploy their solutions in form of modules or “se-
curity apps”. Modularizing security extensions over-
comes the current unsatisfactory situation that policy
authors are either limited to one predetermined secu-
rity model that is embedded in the Android software
stack or that they are forced to confide in a security-
model-specific Android fork instead of the mainline
Android code base. Additionally, this modularization
provides a number of benefits such as easier mainte-
nance and direct comparison of security extensions.
We demonstrated the effectiveness and efficiency of
ASF by porting different security models from re-
lated work to ASF modules and by establishing a
baseline for the impact of our infrastructure on the
system performance.
The source code of our Android Security
Framework and our example modules can be
anonymously retrieved from http://infsec.cs.
uni-saarland.de/projects/asf/ASF_code.zip.
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Appendix
A Policy Module Interface
Listing 2: Interface for Access Control Policy Modules
1 public interface IAccessControlModule {
2 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
3 ∗ General functions
4 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
5 public boolean init();
6 public ModuleConfiguration getConfig();
7 public void shutdown();
8
9 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
10 ∗ Package life−cycle event hooks
11 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
12 public void security_event_installNewPackage(PackageParser.Package pkg, UserHandle user);
13 public void security_event_replacePackage(PackageParser.Package oldPkg, PackageParser.Package newPkg, UserHandle
user);
14 public void security_event_deletePackage(String packageName, int uid, int removedAppId, int removedUsers[],
UserHandle user);
15
16 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
17 ∗ Generic hooks
18 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
19 public void security_generic_checkPolicy(Bundle arguments);
20 public void security_generic_callModule(Bundle arguments);
21 public boolean security_generic_instrumentApp(String packageName);
22
23 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
24 ∗ Broadcast hooks
25 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
26 public boolean security_broadcast_deliverToRegisteredReceiver(Intent intent, ComponentName targetComp, String
requiredPermission, int targetUid, int targetPid, String callerPackage, ApplicationInfo callerApp, int callingUid, int
callingPid);
27 public boolean security_broadcast_processNextBroadcast(Intent intent, ResolveInfo target, String requiredPermission,
String callerPackage, ApplicationInfo callerApp, int callingUid, int callingPid);
28
29 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
30 ∗ ContentProvider.Transport hooks
31 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
32 public boolean security_cp_applyOperation(ContentProviderOperation op, int uid, int pid);
33 public boolean security_cp_preQuery(String callingPkg, Uri uri, String[] projection, String selection, String[]
selectionArgs, String sortOrder, int uid, int pid);
34 public Cursor security_cp_postQuery(Cursor result, String callingPkg, Uri uri, String[] projection, String selection,
String[] selectionArgs, String sortOrder, int uid, int pid);
35 public boolean security_cp_insert(Uri uri, ContentValues initialValues, int uid, int pid);
36 public boolean security_cp_bulkInsert(Uri uri, ContentValues[] initialValues, int uid, int pid);
37 public boolean security_cp_delete(String callingPkg, Uri uri, String selection, String[] selectionArgs, int uid, int pid);
38 public boolean security_cp_update(String callingPkg, Uri uri, ContentValues values, String selection, String[]
selectionArgs, int uid, int pid);
39 public boolean security_cp_openFile(Uri uri, String mode, int uid, int pid);
40 public boolean security_cp_preCall(String providerClass, String method, String arg, Bundle extras, int uid, int pid);
41 public Bundle security_cp_postCall(Bundle result, String providerClass, String method, String arg, Bundle extras, int
uid, int pid);
42
43 public boolean security_contacts_preQueryDirectory(Uri uri, String directoryName, String directoryType, String[]
projection, String selection, String[] selectionArgs, String sortOrder, int uid, int pid);
44 public BulkCursorDescriptor security_contacts_postQueryDirectory(BulkCursorDescriptor result, String directoryName,
String directoryType, String providerName, Uri uri, String[] projection, String selection, String[] selectionArgs, String
sortOrder, int uid, int pid);
45
46 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
47 ∗ Activity related hooks
48 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
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49 public boolean security_ams_startActivity(Intent intent, String resolvedType, ActivityInfo aInfo, String resultWho, int
requestCode, int startFlags, Bundle options, ApplicationInfo callerInfo, int callingPid, int callingUid, int
callingUserId);
50 public boolean security_ams_finishActivity(ComponentName origActivity, ComponentName realActivity, Intent intent,
int userId, ApplicationInfo info, int resultCode, Intent resultData, int uid, int pid);
51 public boolean security_ams_moveTaskToFront(ComponentName origActivity, ComponentName realActivity, Intent
intent, int userId, ApplicationInfo info, int flags, Bundle options, int uid, int pid);
52 public boolean security_ams_moveTaskToBack(ComponentName origActivity, ComponentName realActivity, Intent
intent, int userId, ApplicationInfo info, int uid, int pid);
53 public boolean security_ams_clearApplicationUserData(String packageName, int pkgUid, int userId, int uid, int pid);
54
55 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
56 ∗ Permission check overrides
57 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
58 public int security_ams_checkComponentPermission(String permission, int origUid, int origPid, int tlsUid, int tlsPid,
int owningUid, boolean exported, int callerUid, int callerPid);
59 public boolean security_ams_checkCPUriPermission(Uri uri, ProviderInfo cpi, int processUid, int processPid, boolean
procesIsolated, int processUserId, String processName, ApplicationInfo info, int uid, int pid);
60 public boolean security_ams_checkCPUriPermission(Uri uri, ProviderInfo cpi, int uid, int pid);
61 public boolean security_ams_checkGrantUriPermission(int callingUid, String targetPkg, int targetUid, Uri uri, int
modeFlags);
62 public int security_ams_checkUriPermission(Uri uri, int origUid, int origPid, int tlsUid, int tlsPid, int modeFlags);
63
64 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
65 ∗ PackageManagerService hooks
66 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
67 public boolean security_pms_getPackageInfo(PackageInfo pi, int flags, int userId, boolean isUninstalled, int uid, int
pid);
68 public boolean security_pms_getPackageUid(ApplicationInfo info, int userId, int uid, int pid);
69 public boolean security_pms_getPackageGids(ApplicationInfo info, int[] gids, int uid, int pid);
70 public String[] security_pms_getPackagesForUid(int forUid, String[] packages, int uid, int pid);
71 public boolean security_pms_getNameForUid(int forUid, String name, int uid, int pid);
72 public boolean security_pms_getUidForSharedUser(String sharedUserName, int suid, int uid, int pid);
73 public boolean security_pms_findPreferredActivity(Intent intent, String resolvedType, int flags, ResolveInfo ri, int
priority, int userId, int uid, int pid);
74 public List<ResolveInfo> security_pms_queryIntentActivities(List<ResolveInfo> currentList, Intent intent, String
resolvedType, int flags, int userId, int uid, int pid);
75 public List<ResolveInfo> security_pms_queryIntentReceivers(List<ResolveInfo> currentList, Intent intent, String
resolvedType, int flags, int userId, int uid, int pid);
76 public List<ResolveInfo> security_pms_queryIntentServices(List<ResolveInfo> currentList, Intent intent, String
resolvedType, int flags, int userId, int uid, int pid);
77 public ArrayList<PackageInfo> security_pms_getInstalledPackages(ArrayList<PackageInfo> currentList, int flags, int
userId, int uid, int pid);
78 public ArrayList<PackageInfo> security_pms_getPackagesHoldingPermissions(ArrayList<PackageInfo> currentList, int
flags, int userId, String[] permissions, int uid, int pid);
79 public ArrayList<ApplicationInfo> security_pms_getInstalledApplications(ArrayList<ApplicationInfo> currentList, int
flags, int userId, int uid, int pid);
80 public ArrayList<ApplicationInfo> security_pms_getPersistentApplications(ArrayList<ApplicationInfo> currentList,
int flags, int uid, int pid);
81 public boolean security_pms_getProviderInfo(ProviderInfo pi, ComponentName component, int flags, int userId, int
uid, int pid);
82 public boolean security_pms_getActivityInfo(ActivityInfo ai, ComponentName component, int flags, int userId, int
uid, int pid);
83 public boolean security_pms_getReceiverInfo(ActivityInfo ai, ComponentName component, int flags, int userId, int
uid, int pid);
84 public boolean security_pms_getServiceInfo(ServiceInfo si, ComponentName component, int flags, int userId, int uid,
int pid);
85 /∗ Pre−init function (packages are scanned before init is called) ∗/
86 public boolean security_pms_scanPackage(PackageParser.Package pkg);
87 public boolean security_pms_deletePackage(PackageParser.Package pkg, boolean isSystemApp, boolean dataOnly,
int flags);
88 public boolean security_pms_deletePackageSingleUser(PackageParser.Package pkg, boolean isSystemApp, int flags,
int user);
89
90 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
91 ∗ Content Provider (general) related hooks
92 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
93 /∗ Changed ProcessRecord to public for our module SDK ∗/
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94 public boolean security_ams_checkContentProviderPermission(ProviderInfo cpi, String permission, int processUid, int
processPid, boolean procesIsolated, int processUserId, String processName, ApplicationInfo info, int uid, int pid);
95 public boolean security_ams_checkContentProviderPermission(ProviderInfo cpi, String permission, int uid, int pid);
96 public boolean security_ams_checkPathPermission(ProviderInfo cpi, PathPermission pp, String permission, int
processUid, int processPid, boolean procesIsolated, int processUserId, String processName, ApplicationInfo info,
int uid, int pid);
97 public boolean security_ams_checkPathPermission(ProviderInfo cpi, PathPermission pp, String permission, int uid, int
pid);
98 public boolean security_ams_checkAppSwitchAllowed(int uid, int pid);
99
100 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
101 ∗ Service related hooks
102 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
103 public List<ActivityManager.RunningServiceInfo>
security_ams_getServices(ArrayList<ActivityManager.RunningServiceInfo> srvList, int uid, int pid);
104 public boolean security_ams_peekService(Intent service, String resolvedType, ServiceInfo serviceInfo, ApplicationInfo
appInfo, String packageName, String permission, int uid, int pid);
105 public boolean security_ams_startService(Intent service, String resolvedType, ComponentName name, String
shortName, ServiceInfo serviceInfo, ApplicationInfo appInfo, int srvUserId, String packageName, String
processName, String permission, int callingPid, int callingUid);
106 public boolean security_ams_stopService(Intent service, String resolvedType, ComponentName name, String
shortName, ServiceInfo serviceInfo, ApplicationInfo appInfo, int srvUserId, String packageName, String
processName, String permission, int callingPid, int callingUid);
107 public boolean security_ams_bindService(Intent service, String resolvedType, int flags, ComponentName name, String
shortName, ServiceInfo serviceInfo, ApplicationInfo appInfo, int srvUserId, String packageName, String
processName, String permission, int callingPid, int callingUid);
108
109 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
110 ∗ LocationManagerService hooks
111 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
112 public void security_location_getAllProviders(List<String> providerList, int uid, int pid);
113 public void security_location_getProviders(List<String> providers, Criteria criteria, boolean enabledOnly, int uid, int
pid);
114 /∗ Unhide LocationRequest for our module SDK ∗/
115 public void security_location_requestLocationUpdates(LocationRequest request, PendingIntent pi, int uid, int pid);
116 public void security_location_removeLocationUpdates(PendingIntent pi, int uid, int pid);
117 public Location security_location_getLastLocation(Location currentLocation, LocationRequest request, int uid, int pid);
118 public boolean security_location_addGpsStatusListener(int uid, int pid);
119 public boolean security_location_sendExtraCommand(String provider, String command, Bundle extras, int uid, int
pid);
120 /∗ Unhide Geofence class for our module SDK ∗/
121 public void security_location_requestGeofence(LocationRequest request, Geofence geofence, PendingIntent intent, int
uid, int pid);
122 public void security_location_removeGeofence(Geofence geofence, PendingIntent intent, int uid, int pid);
123 public boolean security_location_isProviderEnabled(String provider, int uid, int pid);
124 public Location security_location_reportLocation(Location location, boolean passive, int uid, int pid);
125 public ProviderProperties security_location_addTestProvider(String name, ProviderProperties properties, int uid, int
pid);
126 public boolean security_location_removeTestProvider(String provider, int uid, int pid);
127 public boolean security_location_setTestProviderLocation(String provider, Location location, int uid, int pid);
128 public boolean security_location_clearTestProviderLocation(String provider, int uid, int pid);
129 public boolean security_location_setTestProviderEnabled(String provider, boolean enabled, int uid, int pid);
130 public boolean security_location_clearTestProviderEnabled(String provider, int uid, int pid);
131 public boolean security_location_setTestProviderStatus(String provider, int status, Bundle extras, long updateTime,
int uid, int pid);
132 public boolean security_location_clearTestProviderStatus(String provider, int uid, int pid);
133 public boolean security_location_sendLocationUpdate(Location location, String receiverPackageName, int pid, int uid);
134 public boolean security_location_updateFence(Location location, Geofence fence, PendingIntent fenceIntent, String
fencePackageName, int uid);
135
136 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
137 ∗ AudioService hooks
138 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
139 public boolean security_audio_adjustStreamVolume(int streamType, int direction, int flags, int uid, int pid);
140 public boolean security_audio_setStreamVolume(int streamType, int index, int flags, int uid, int pid);
141 public boolean security_audio_setMasterVolume(int volume, int flags, int uid, int pid);
142 public boolean security_audio_setRingerMode(int mode, int uid, int pid);
143 public boolean security_audio_setSpeakerphoneOn(boolean on, int uid, int pid);
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144
145 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
146 ∗ TelephonyService hooks
147 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
148 public boolean security_telephony_call(String number, int uid, int pid);
149 public List<NeighboringCellInfo> security_telephony_getNeighboringCellInfo(List<NeighboringCellInfo> currentList,
int uid, int pid);
150
151 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
152 ∗ SMS and MMS Service hooks
153 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
154 public boolean security_sms_copyMessageToIcc(int status, byte[] pdu, byte[] smsc, int uid, int pid);
155 public boolean security_sms_getAllMessagesFromIcc(int uid, int pid);
156 public List<RawByteData> security_sms_getAllMessagesFromIccFilter(List<RawByteData> rawSms, int uid, int pid);
157 public boolean security_sms_sendData(String destAddr, String scAddr, int destPort, byte[] data, PendingIntent
sentIntent, PendingIntent deliveryIntent, int uid, int pid);
158 public boolean security_sms_sendText(String destAddr, String scAddr, String text, PendingIntent sentIntent,
PendingIntent deliveryIntent, int uid, int pid);
159 public boolean security_sms_sendMultipartText(String destAddr, String scAddr, List<String> parts,
List<PendingIntent> sentIntents, List<PendingIntent> deliveryIntents, int uid, int pid);
160 public boolean security_sms_updateMessageOnIccEf(int index, int status, byte[] pdu, int uid, int pid);
161
162 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
163 ∗ WiFi Service hooks
164 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
165 public List<ScanResult> security_wifi_getScanResult(List<ScanResult> result, int uid, int pid);
166 public boolean security_wifi_startScan(int uid, int pid);
167 public boolean security_wifi_setWifiEnabled(boolean enable, int uid, int pid);
168 public boolean security_wifi_setWifiApEnabled(WifiConfiguration wifiConfig, boolean enabled, int uid, int pid);
169 public boolean security_wifi_setWifiApConfiguration(WifiConfiguration wifiConfig, int uid, int pid);
170 public boolean security_wifi_disconnect(int uid, int pid);
171 public boolean security_wifi_reconnect(int uid, int pid);
172 public boolean security_wifi_reassociate(int uid, int pid);
173 public List<WifiConfiguration> security_wifi_getConfiguredNetworks(List<WifiConfiguration> currentList, int uid, int
pid);
174 public boolean security_wifi_addOrUpdateNetwork(WifiConfiguration config, int uid, int pid);
175 public boolean security_wifi_removeNetwork(int netId, int uid, int pid);
176 public boolean security_wifi_enableNetwork(int netId, boolean disableOthers, int uid, int pid);
177 public boolean security_wifi_disableNetwork(int netId, int uid, int pid);
178 public boolean security_wifi_getConnectionInfo(WifiInfo info, int uid, int pid);
179 public boolean security_wifi_setCountryCode(String countryCode, boolean persist, int uid, int pid);
180 public boolean security_wifi_setFrequencyBand(int band, boolean persist, int uid, int pid);
181 public boolean security_wifi_startWifi(int uid, int pid);
182 public boolean security_wifi_stopWifi(int uid, int pid);
183 public boolean security_wifi_addToBlacklist(String bssid, int uid, int pid);
184 public boolean security_wifi_clearBlacklist(int uid, int pid);
185 public boolean security_wifi_getWifiServiceMessenger(int uid, int pid);
186 public boolean security_wifi_getWifiStateMachineMessenger(int uid, int pid);
187 public boolean security_wifi_getConfigFile(String currentConfig, int uid, int pid);
188
189 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
190 ∗ ClipboardService hooks
191 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
192 public ClipData security_clip_getPrimaryClip(ClipData currentPrimary, int clipUid, int uid, int pid);
193 public boolean security_clip_setPrimaryClip(ClipData clip, int uid, int pid);
194 public boolean security_clip_informPrimaryClipChanged(ClipData currentPrimary, int setByUid, String packageName,
int uid);
195 public ClipDescription security_clip_getPrimaryClipDescription(ClipDescription currentDescription, int clipUid, int uid,
int pid);
196 public boolean security_clip_hasPrimaryClip(boolean hasClipboard, int clipUid, int uid, int pid);
197 public boolean security_clip_hasClipboardText(String currentText, int clipUid, int uid, int pid);
198
199 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
200 ∗ PowerManagerService hooks
201 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
202 public boolean security_power_acquireWakeLock(String tag, WorkSource ws, int uid, int pid);
203 public boolean security_power_userActivity(long eventTime, int event, int flags, int uid, int pid);
204 public boolean security_power_goToSleep(long eventTime, int reason, int uid, int pid);
20
205 public boolean security_power_wakeUp(long eventTime, int uid, int pid);
206 public boolean security_power_nap(long time, int uid, int pid);
207 public boolean security_power_setBacklightBrightness(int brightness, int uid, int pid);
208 public boolean security_power_reboot(boolean confirm, String reason, boolean wait, int uid, int pid);
209
210 /∗ ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
211 ∗ PhoneSubscriberInfo hooks
212 ∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗ ∗/
213 public String security_phonesubinfo_getDeviceId(String id, int uid, int pid);
214 public String security_phonesubinfo_getDeviceSvn(String svn, int uid, int pid);
215 public String security_phonesubinfo_getSubscriberId(String id, int uid, int pid);
216 public String security_phonesubinfo_getGroupIdLevel1(String groupid, int uid, int pid);
217 public String security_phonesubinfo_getIccSerialNumber(String icc, int uid, int pid);
218 public String security_phonesubinfo_getLine1Number(String number, int uid, int pid);
219 public String security_phonesubinfo_getLine1AlphaTag(String tag, int uid, int pid);
220 public String security_phonesubinfo_getMsisdn(String msisdn, int uid, int pid);
221 public String security_phonesubinfo_getVoiceMailNumber(String number, int uid, int pid);
222 public String security_phonesubinfo_getVoiceMailAphaTag(String tag, int uid, int pid);
223 public String security_phonesubinfo_getIsimImpi(String impi, int uid, int pid);
224 public String security_phonesubinfo_getIsimDomain(String domain, int uid, int pid);
225 public String[] security_phonesubinfo_getIsimImpu(String impu[], int uid, int pid);
226 }
Listing 3: Interface for Access Control Policy Modules to Linux Security Module
1 public interface KMACAdaptor {
2 public boolean init();
3 public boolean isEnabled();
4 public boolean isEnforcing();
5 public boolean setEnforcing(boolean value);
6 public boolean setContext(String path, Bundle context);
7 public boolean restoreContext(Bundle context);
8 public Bundle getContext(String path);
9 public Bundle getPeerContext(FileDescriptor fd); /∗ wrapper around getsockopt call to LSM ∗/
10 public Bundle getCurrentContext();
11 public Bundle getProcessContext(int pid);
12 public Bundle getConfig(Bundle args); /∗ e.g., get list of defined booleans or one specific boolean value ∗/
13 public boolean setConfig(Bundle conf); /∗ e.g., set a boolean value ∗/
14 public boolean checkAccess(Bundle args); /∗ args can be, e.g., quadruple of subject ctx, object ctx, object class, op ∗/
15
16 /∗ Zygote is statically integrated with the Kernel MAC, thus, each KMACAdaptor must implemented these hooks in
ZygoteConnection ∗/
17 public boolean security_zygote_applyUidSecurityPolicy(Credentials creds, Bundle peerSecurityContext);
18 public boolean security_zygote_applyRlimitSecurityPolicy(Credentials creds, Bundle peerSecurityContext);
19 public boolean security_zygote_applyCapabilitiesSecurityPolicy(Credentials creds, Bundle peerSecurityContext);
20 public boolean security_zygote_applyInvokeWithSecurityPolicy(Credentials creds, Bundle peerSecurityContext);
21 public boolean security_zygote_applySecurityLabelPolicy(Credentials creds, Bundle peerSecurityContext);
22 }
Listing 4: Methods for IRM instrumentation
1 public class Instrumentation {
2 public static void initClass(Class<?> clazz);
3
4 public static int redirectMethod(String fromDescriptor, String toDescriptor);
5 public static int redirectMethod(Signature from, Signature to);
6
7 public static void callVoidMethod(Class<?> caller, Object _this, Object... args);
8 public static void callVoidMethod(String id, Object _this, Object... args);
9 public static void callVoidMethod(int methodId, Object _this, Object... args);
10 public static int callIntMethod(Class<?> caller, Object _this, Object... args);
11 public static int callIntMethod(String id, Object _this, Object... args);
12 public static int callIntMethod(int methodId, Object _this, Object... args);
13 public static boolean callBooleanMethod(Class<?> caller, Object _this, Object... args);
14 public static boolean callBooleanMethod(String id, Object _this, Object... args);
15 public static boolean callBooleanMethod(int methodId, Object _this, Object... args);
16 public static Object callObjectMethod(Class<?> caller, Object _this, Object... args);
17 public static Object callObjectMethod(String id, Object _this, Object... args);
18 public static Object callObjectMethod(int methodId, Object _this, Object... args);
21
19 public static void callStaticVoidMethod(Class<?> caller, Class<?> _clazz, Object... args);
20 public static void callStaticVoidMethod(String id, Class<?> _clazz, Object... args);
21 public static void callStaticVoidMethod(int methodId, Class<?> _clazz, Object... args);
22 public static Object callStaticObjectMethod(Class<?> caller, Class<?> _clazz, Object... args);
23 public static Object callStaticObjectMethod(String id, Class<?> _clazz, Object... args);
24 public static Object callStaticObjectMethod(int methodId, Class<?> _clazz, Object... args);
25 }
B Break Down of Policy Enforcement Coverage
System App/Service Number of hooks Example hooks
BroadcastQueue 2 deliverToRegisteredReceiver, processNextBroadcast
ContentProvider 12 insert, update, preQuery, postQuery
ActivityStack 5 startActivity, moveTaskToBack, finishActivity
ActivityManagerService 10 checkComponentPermission, checkUriPermission, check-
GrantUriPermission
PackageManagerService 21 getPackageInfo, findPreferredActivity, queryIntentRe-
ceivers, getServiceInfo, scanPackage, deletePackage
ActiveServices 5 startService, bindService, getServices
LocationManagerService 21 getProviders, requestLocationUpdates, requestGeofence,
reportLocation, setTestProviderLocation
AudioService 5 adjustStreamVolume, setMasterVolume, setRingerMode
TelephonyService 2 call, getNeighboringCells
SMSService 7 getAllMessagesFromIcc, sendData, sendText
WiFiService 23 getScanResults, addOrUpdateNetwork, getConnection-
Info, getWifiServiceManager
ClipboardService 7 getPrimaryClip, setPrimaryClip
PowerManagerService 6 acquireWakeLock, userActivity, reboot
PhoneSubInfo 13 getDeviceId, getIccSerialNumber, getLine1Number,
getIsimImpi
Total: 139
Table 3: Break down of hooked system apps and services.
C Break Down of Most Frequently Called Enforcement Hooks
Android Security Framework Stock Android v4.3
Hooked function Frequency Mean (µs) Frequency Mean (µs)
ActivityManagerService.checkComponentPermission 1705 39.413±0.658 2024 36.518±0.523
BroadcastQueue.broadcastIntent 908 305.274±16.752 1007 332.328±17.085
SettingsProvider.call 544 67.710±3.004 669 46.574±1.723
PackageManagerService.queryIntentReceivers 438 92.458±3.598 745 84.343±2.296
PackageManagerService.queryIntentActivities 296 192.178±15.458 242 195.211±18.355
PowerManagerService.acquireWakeLock 229 296.246±10.740 255 295.601±11.121
PackageManagerService.getActivityInfo 229 53.039±2.223 203 45.551±2.104
PackageManagerService.getPackageInfo 207 47.324±2.339 307 37.774±1.456
PackageManagerService.queryIntentServices 123 131.744±9.220 134 106.354±6.069
PackageManagerService.getPackageUid 93 35.767±2.353 201 30.005±0.000
Table 4: Ten most frequently invoked hooked functions and their average performance overhead on Android
Security Framework vs. stock Android v4.3. The margins of error are given for the 95% confidence
interval.
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D Module Performance
Table 5 provides an overview of the performance impact of different security models as reported in their
respective publications (native) and as measured by us for their implementation as module (ASF Module).
However, it should be noted, that these are not directly comparable, because all security models have
originally been implemented for a different Android OS version and been tested on a different hardware
platform. Figure 8 presents the cumulative frequency distribution for the measured performance overhead of
our example modules versus stock Android v4.3.
Use-case Implementation Android version Test device Average (µs)
CRePE [10]⋆ Native v2.3 HTC Magic ≈ 100ASF Module ‡ v4.3 Nexus 7 168.943±5.884
XManDroid [6] Native
◇ v2.2 Nexus One 532
ASF Module ‡ v4.3 Nexus 7 206.062±5.573
FlaskDroid [8] (middleware)† Native v4.0.3 Galaxy Nexus 452ASF Module ‡ v4.3 Nexus 7 359.317±11.015
Table 5: Performance measurements of our example modules.⋆ Two rules loaded. ◇ Weighted average for cached and uncached checks. † With basic policy loaded.
‡ Weighted average incl. IPC roundtrip between hook and module.
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Figure 8: Relative cumulative frequency distribution of example modules’ performance overhead vs. stock
Android v4.3.
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E Policy-agnostic Calls from Zygote
to Linux Security Module
We briefly explain at the example of Zygote how the
generic interface for calls to the kernel module can be
used. As described in Section 5, we added a generic
interface implementation, called KMAC.java, to the
Android API. KMAC.java implements the interface
described in Listing 3 in Appendix A. KMAC.java in
turn loads via the Java reflection API the LSM.java
classes and via JNI the liblsm.so deployed by mod-
ules and uses them to forward calls to the kernel
module. LSM.java must hence also implement the
interface in Listing 3. LSM.java and liblsm.so
are responsible for translating the function argu-
ments to the kernel module specific protocol. For
instance, consider Listing 5 that shows how the
KMAC interface is used in Zygote to verify that the
caller is allowed to specify certain parameters like
the UID/GID of a new app process. It first uses
the getPeerContext function to retrieve the kernel-
level security context of the calling process. This
information is stored in a generic Bundle structure.
It afterwards uses this information to request pol-
icy decisions from the Linux security module such
as security_zygote_applyUidSecurityPolicy (a
Zygote-specific hook). Listing 6 shows how the
SE Android module (cf. Section 6) implements the
interface to translate the arguments to SELinux-
specific arguments and to call the SELinux ker-
nel module. Here, SELinux.java takes the role
of LSM.java and SELinux.getPeerContext and
SELinux.checkSELinuxAccess are native functions
that call via libselinux.so the kernel module.
Hence, libselinux.so takes the role of liblsm.so.
Listing 5: Use of generic Kernel module interface
in ZygoteConnection.java
1 private final Bundle peerSecurityContext;
2 private static final KMAC mKMAC = new KMAC();
3 ...
4 ZygoteConnection(LocalSocket socket) throws
IOException {
5 ...
6 peerSecurityContext =
mKMAC.getPeerContext(mSocket.getFileDescriptor());
7 ...
8 }
9 ...
10 private static void applyUidSecurityPolicy(Arguments
args, Credentials peer, Bundle
peerSecurityContext) {
11 ...
12 boolean allowed =
mKMAC.security_zygote_applyUidSecurityPolicy(peer,
peerSecurityContext);
13 ...
14 }
Listing 6: Implementation of generic LSM interface
for SELinux kernel module
1 package android.os;
2
3 public class SELinuxAdaptor implements
KMACAdaptor {
4 ...
5 @Override
6 public Bundle getPeerContext(FileDescriptor fd) {
7 String ctx = SELinux.getPeerContext(fd);
8 Bundle ret = new Bundle();
9 ret.putString("selinux.context", ctx);
10 return ret;
11 }
12
13 @Override
14 public boolean
security_zygote_applyUidSecurityPolicy(Credentials
creds, Bundle peerSecurityContext) {
15 String peerCtx =
peerSecurityContext.getString("selinux.context");
16 return SELinux.checkSELinuxAccess(peerCtx,
peerCtx, "zygote", "specifyids");
17 }
18 ...
19 }
F Usage of Instrumentation API
We use the abstract example shown in Listing 7
to illustrate the usage of our instrumentation
API. Calling Instrumentation.redirectMethod()
(line 4) diverts the control from method foo()
of class com.test.A to the method bar() of
class com.test.B. It returns a reference to the
original function, which we store in a variable
A_foo. Subsequent calls to A.foo() (line 9)
will invoke B.bar() instead. The original
method foo() can still be invoked by calling
Instrumentation.callOriginalMethod(A_foo)
(line 11).
Listing 7: Usage of the IRM instrumentation library
1 public static void main(String[] args) {
2 A.foo(); // calls A.foo()
3
4 MethodHandle A_foo =
Instrumentation.redirectMethod(
5 "com.test.A−>foo()",
6 "com.test.B−>bar()"
7 );
8 // calls B.bar():
9 A.foo();
10 // calls A.foo():
11 Instrumentation.callOriginalMethod(A_foo);
12 }
G Details on FlaskDroid Hook Logic
We illustrate at the example of FlaskDroid [8] how
the hook logic of existing solutions can be moved
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into a module. Listing 8 shows one of the original
FlaskDroid hooks in the getAllProviders function
of the Android location service. The hook calls via
the service’s context to FlaskDroid’s policy server
where the access control decision is determined by
the checkPolicy function. This function internally
determines the subject’s and object’s security type
from their UIDs6. A denial of access results always
in a security exception that is thrown back to the
caller of the location service API. Listing 9 shows the
re-implementation of this logic in a module for our
Android Security Framework by simply over-
riding the corresponding enforcement function for
LocationManagerService.getAllProviders and
directly calling the checkPolicy function with all
required parameters provided by the hook. It should
be noted that in FlaskDroid the security exception
in case of denied access is hardcoded in the sys-
tem, while in an implementation as a module the
FlaskDroid authors could alternatively change the
enforcement to a less interruptive enforcement by re-
assigning the providerList parameter to an empty
list of Strings, i.e., pretending to the calling app
that there is no location provider present in the sys-
tem. In fact, as a module, such a change in strategy
can be more easily rolled out than as a hardcoded
implementation within the middleware.
Listing 8: Original FlaskDroid hook in
com.android.server.LocationManagerService
1 public List<String> getAllProviders() {
2 ...
3 if(mContext.checkSecurityContext(Binder.getCallingUid(),
Process.myUid(), "locationService_c",
"getAllProviders") !=
PackageManager.PERMISSION_GRANTED) {
4 throw new SecurityException("Denied␣by␣MAC␣
policy");
5 }
6 ...
Listing 9: Re-implementation of the hook from List-
ing 8 in a security module
1 @Override
2 public void
security_location_getAllProviders(List<String>
providerList, int uid, int pid) {
3 if(checkPolicy(uid, Binder.getCallingUid(),
"locationService_c", "getAllProviders") ==
PackageManager.PERMISSION_DENIED) {
4 throw new SecurityException("Denied␣by␣MAC␣
policy");
5 }
6 }
6This is the original FlaskDroid behavior that is, as men-
tioned in Section 6.4, flawed.
H Further Security Modules
In this Section we briefly explain further example
use-cases from related work that we ported as secu-
rity modules in case their source code was available
to us or that we re-implemented according to their
published descriptions.
H.1 AppOps and IntentFirewall
Google introduced (unofficially) with Android v4.3
the AppOps infrastructure for dynamic, more fine-
grained Permissions. It introduced hooks in differ-
ent system services and apps, which query a central
AppOpsService whether an application is allowed to
perform an operation (e.g., retrieving the location
of the device or querying a ContentProvider). The
AppOps rules define a mapping from UID/package
name to allowed operations. AppOps offers an in-
terface to apps to retrieve the current configuration.
Additionally, Google introduced (again unofficially)
an IntentFirewall, which acts as a reference monitor
for certain Intent-based operations like starting an
Activity. The IntentFirewall rules describe which
caller is allowed to receive which kind of Intent ob-
ject, using the Intent’s attributes such as destination
component. The sending or processing of Intents
that violate these rules is aborted.
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Figure 9: AppOps and IntentFirewall module
Implementation as a module: We ported App-
Ops and IntentFirewall (from Android v4.3) to a se-
curity module for Android Security Framework
(cf. Figure 9) by moving the AppOpsService and the
IntentFirewall classes into a module. Our module
comprises 2290 lines of code and differs in 33.71% of
all LoC from the native implementation. The bulk
of the changes (520 LoC), were required to move the
hook logic of both services from the system apps and
services of Android into the module by using our en-
forcement functions. For the IntentFirewall, this was
straightforward and we only had to substitute a di-
rect callback from IntentFirewall to the ActivityMan-
agerService by our ASF callback mechanism. For
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the AppOpsService, we had to add a mapping from
caller PID to package name. By default the hooks
of AppOps determine the caller’s package name and
pass this information to the AppOpsService for policy
check. Since this is a policy-specific logic of the hooks,
our framework hooks do not (by default) provide the
caller’s package name and we re-implemented this
logic in our module by using our callback interface,
which allows us to retrieve the package name for
app PIDs. Moreover, we adapted the AppOpsService
interface to retrieve/configure the current policies to
a Bundle-based communication (e.g., we enabled the
PackageOps and OpEntry to be serialized into a Bun-
dle). AppOps is, furthermore, partially integrated
into the Settings application to allow users to disable
notifications from selected apps. We replaced this
policy-specific channel between Settings and AppOps
also with our policy-agnostic Bundle-based commu-
nication. Modules that support this Settings option,
can return a value indicating whether notifications
are disabled or not. If the module does not support
this feature, Settings app by default allows notifica-
tions. However, our AppOps module does currently
not support the operation watching feature, which re-
quires the registration of application callback objects
with the module.
H.2 Saint [35]
Saint is an extension for Android OS v1.5 that al-
lows app developers to ship their apps with policy
rules that determine how the app can interact with
other apps in the system. For instance, the rules can
declare that only apps with a specific package name,
version, or set of permissions are allowed to call the
app or be called by the app. The rules also support
defining Intent attributes as rule criteria. The rules
are enforced by the system through hooks in different
system apps and services, such as the ActivityMan-
agerService, that allow monitoring operations for the
different app component types. Additionally, Saint
provides a front-end app (FrameworkPolicyManager),
that allows the user to override developer policies.
Implementation as a module: We re-
implemented Saint as a security module by
developing a module (729 LoC) that supports Saint’s
policy language as described in [35]. We use our
event functions to extract policy files from newly
installed application packages and insert them into
a policy database in our module. We use different
hooks in the ActivityManagerService (e.g., starting
an Activity, resolving an Activity, finding active
services), Broadcast subsystem, or ContentProvider
class to enforce the Saint runtime policies. Using the
scanPackage hook in the PackageManagerService
we enforce Saint install-time policies to decided
whether a new app is installed. Communication
between the module the front-end app is again
implemented based on Bundles. We successfully
verified our Saint module’s effectiveness using the
policies for the running example described by the
Saint author’s [35] and a set of test apps that
implement Saint’s example scenario.
H.3 TrustDroid [7]
TrustDroid extends the Android OS v2.2 architecture
with isolation of different domains such as “work”
and “private”. Every application is classified dur-
ing installation into one of the available domains.
For classification, TrustDroid uses package-specific
attributes such as developer signature, external sig-
nature, or package name. Enforcement hooks at
middleware and kernel level prevent at runtime any
communication between different domains. At kernel
level, TrustDroid uses TOMOYO Linux to enforce
the policies. Policy rules for newly classified apps are
propagated from the middleware to the kernel.
Implementation as a module: To re-implement
TrustDroid as a security module (862 lines of code),
we deployed a TOMOYO-enabled Linux kernel on the
device (i.e., our Kernel Sub-Module) and devel-
oped a Middleware Sub-Module that deploys the
required LSM.java and libccs.so to communicate
with the kernel module. Additionally, we used our
scanPackage hook in the PackageManagerService to
classify newly installed applications and keep a map-
ping from UID to domain.7 Because TrustDroid’s
policy is static and very simple, its architecture does
not distinguish between policy enforcement and pol-
icy decision point, but instead every hook retrieves
the domain of the current subject and object and de-
nies access if their domains differ. We re-implemented
this logic using the enforcement functions of our mod-
ule, which was a straightforward implementation. For
ContentProviders (e.g., Contacts) TrustDroid classi-
fies the database entries and returns on access only
the entries that have the same domain as the caller.
Since we prohibit by design such as policy-specific
intrusions into the default ContentProviders, we use
our pre-query hooks to modify selection arguments to
retrieve only contacts that are allowed for the current
caller (e.g., where the contact’s group indicates a pri-
vate contact). Using two example applications that
7TrustDroid does not allow apps in a shared sandbox to
be classified differently.
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are classified differently, we verified the effectiveness
of our TrustDroid module.
H.4 Data shadowing [24, 57]
Both AppFence [24] as well as TISSA [57] provide
a data shadowing feature. Data shadowing means,
that an application that wants to retrieve sensitive
information (e.g., contacts information, IMEI num-
ber, or location data) only get empty, fake, or filtered
data.
Implementation as a module: We
re-implemented the data shadowing fea-
tures of AppFence and TISSA as a mod-
ule by using our edit automaton hooks in
the ContentProvider.Transport class, the
ContactsProvider-specific hooks, Telephony service
and Location service. For ContentProvider and
ContactsProvider, in particular our pre-query and
post-query hooks allowed us a fine-grained filtering
or replacing (faking) of the returned data as well as
returning an empty data set. However, the current
coverage of our enforcement hooks does not include
some of the data shadowing points of AppFence,
such as microphone, logs, or camera, and we plan on
adding them in the future.
H.5 Kirin [15]
Kirin extends Android’s application installation pro-
cess with policy-based checks and denies installation
of a new app when it violates the policy. Based on
its time of publication, we presume that it was devel-
oped for Android OS v1.5.8 The actual policy check
was performed in a dedicated Android application
developed for Kirin, which interacted with the instal-
lation process. These policies are based on the set of
permissions requested by an app and the interfaces
(e.g., Broadcast receivers) it wants to register in the
system. The installation of apps that are rejected by
the policy is denied.
Implementation as a module: To re-implement
Kirin’s security service as a security module, we de-
veloped a module that supports Kirin’s security lan-
guage. Using our scanPackage hook in the Package-
ManagerService, we check new applications against
the policy and abort their installation in case the
policy rejects the application. Our Kirin module
comprises 246 lines of code.
8http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_version_
history
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